# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MIAMI DIVISION 

Case No.: 9:20-cv-81205-RAR

## SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Plaintiff
vs.
COMPLETE BUSINESS SOLUTIONS GROUP, INC., d/b/a PAR FUNDING, et. al.
Defendant

## NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE

COMES NOW, Defendant Joseph Cole Barleta ("Cole"), by and through his Undersigned Counsel, and files the instant NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE

1. On August 3, 2022, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal sent correspondence to Glenda Powers of Courtroom Services pertaining to the transcript, which has long since been ordered. See Exhibit "A"
2. Although it appears the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal does not command either Joseph Cole Barleta ("Defendant-Appellant") or Ryan Stumphauzer ("Appellee") from taking any affirmative steps, in an abundance of caution, Defendant-Appellant Barleta shall file in this Court the Transcript of the hearing on appeal. Andre G. Raikhelson, Esq.

Law Offices of Andre G. Raikhelson, LLC.
Appellate Counsel for Joseph Cole Barleta
7000 W Palmetto Park Road, Suite 210
Boca Raton, Florida, 33433
Telephone:(954) 895-5566
arlaw@raikhelsonlaw.com
/s/ Andre G. Raikhelson
ANDRE G. RAIKHELSON
FBN:. 123657

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA (FT. LAUDERDALE DIVISION)
CASE NO. 9:20-CV-81205-RAR
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SECURITIES \& EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

PLAINTIFF,
vs.
COMPLETE BUSINESS
SOLUTIONS GROUP, INC.,
Scheduled for 10:30 a.m. 10:49 a.m. to 12:13 p.m.

DEFENDANT.
Pages 1 - 69

HEARING
MOTION TO COMPEL
(VIA ZOOM)

> BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE RODOLFO A. RUIZ, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES VIA ZOOM:

ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF:
AMIE RIGGLE BERLIN, ESQ.
United States Securities and
Exchange Commission
801 Brickell Avenue
Suite 1800
Miami, Florida 33131

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APPEARANCES VIA ZOOM (CONTINUED:)
    ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT
    JOSEPH COLE BARLETA:
    ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT
JAMES MILLER KAPLAN, ESQ.
    LISA MCELHONE:
    ON BEHALF OF RECEIVERS:
    GAETAN J. ALFANO, ESQ.
    Pietragallo Gordon Alfano
        Bosick & Raspanti, LLP
        1818 Market Street
        Suite 3402
        Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
        RECEIVERS:
TIMOTHY A. KOLAYA, ESQ.
RYAN K. STUMPHAUZER, ESQ.
Stumphauzer Foslid Soman
Ross & Kolaya, PLLC
2 South Biscayne Boulevard
Suite 1600
Miami, Florida 33131
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STENOGRAPHICALLY
REPORTED BY:
GLENDA M. POWERS, RPR, CRR, FPR
Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
400 North Miami Avenue
Miami, Florida 33128
(Call to the order of the Court:)
THE COURT: Good morning, everyone.
We're going to make sure everyone's been let in. I think we've got everyone here. Lisa, can you hear me?

And in the courtroom, how's audio; okay?
So I think everyone's ready to go, so we'll get started
here. We are here this morning in Case Number 20-81205,
Securities and Exchange Commission versus Complete Business
Solutions, Inc. et al.
I would like to get appearances for the record.
On behalf of the plaintiff.
MS. BERLIN: This is Amy Riggle Berlin on behalf of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

THE COURT: And on behalf of the defendants, in particular, those defendants that are going to be the subject of today's case -- or today's argument, Mr. Cole Barleta.

Go ahead.
MS. SCHEIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Bettina Schein on behalf of Joe Cole.

THE COURT: Good morning.
And on behalf of the Receiver, who I know really is going to be arguing today's motion. It's really the Receiver's motion, not on behalf of the SEC.

Who do we have here today?
MR. ALfANO: Good morning, Your Honor. Gaetan Alfano,
and I'm joined by Timothy Kolaya and by Ryan Stumphauzer, Receivers.

THE COURT: Okay, very good. And I do see that one of the folks is Mr. Kaplan, I wanted to ask you, who are here on behalf of this morning, just so $I$ know for my notes?

MR. KAPLAN: Good morning, Your Honor. James Kaplan, I represent Lisa Mcelhone. This is my first appearance.

THE COURT: Okay, very good. Thank you, Mr. Kaplan.
And I do see Ms. Mcelhone and Mr. Cole, I see, are present and listening in, so welcome to them as well.

So what we're going to do this morning is have some brief oral argument, and I'm going to share where I'm at with regards to the motion to compel. Let's just recap briefly specifically what we're talking about.

There has been a motion to compel documents that has been, you know, pending for a little bit of time now, filed by the Receiver, the Court's Receiver, that is looking to obtain a number of documents that would deal with Mr. Cole's accounts and, specifically, not only his accounts, but some of his holdings, his assets, et cetera.

And my understanding going into today's hearing is that counsel has objected in large part due to concerns regarding implication of Fifth Amendment privilege.

And so that the record is clear, the motion that we are handling today is Docket Entry 1188. That's the motion to
compel defendant Joseph Cole Barleta to comply with court orders.

And my concern, Ms. Schein, I'll look to you, and I know you are objecting to the production on Fifth Amendment grounds, is somewhat twofold, right.

What the Receiver's counsel's pointed out, first and foremost, is that these documents have been produced already as part of some disclosures that Mr. Cole provided to the FDIC some time ago, I believe, on or about 2019, September 24th, 2019.

And so the first issue here is there has been, essentially, to the extent we are going to describe these documents as testimonial in nature, there has been a voluntary production of these documents already; not only were they voluntarily prepared and previously generated, but as we have seen in some of the case law cited, for example, in the Point Break Media case, that's 343 F. Supp 3d, 1282, and that relies on Hubbell, which both parties mentioned from the Supreme Court in 2000.

You know, we don't have a Fifth Amendment concern, once an individual chooses to voluntarily prepare a written account, it serves as a waiver of the Fifth Amendment rejection and, therefore, because there's already been production to the FDIC of these documents, we would not have the benefit or the ability of -- Mr. Cole would not have the ability to invoke the

Fifth Amendment privilege.
And, you know, that's close from the Fisher case, which you also both cited, from the Supreme Court in 1976 dealing with an IRS production, okay.

So that's the first issue $I$ have, is there's been a voluntary component of it, there's already been disclosure, that would nullify or eliminate the Fifth Amendment privilege that you have invoked.

The second argument, really, is an alternative argument, but just as, I think, strong as the first, is the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine being relied on by the Receiver; and really that comes down to the fact that we do have what is termed "reasonable particularity," in terms of identifying what the documents are; because this whole request, the only reason the Receiver even knows what to ask for is because of this 2019 Interagency Biographical and Financial Report that he found in the Par Funding records, and that's the one that laid out Cole's assets, which was cash on hand, marketable securities, real estate, a propriety interest, and other securities, retirement funds, mortgages, liabilities, et cetera.

So that's where he -- the Receiver -- got wind of these documents. And so knowing that these have already been disclosed -- or that these have been produced, their existence is known. There is no, you know, testimonial act, in the sense of using your mind to come up with the disclosures so that you
are evidencing the existence of certain documents and putting these things together.

The way I read the case law both of you have relied on is under this Foregone Conclusion Doctrine, the act of the production is not going to be testimonial even if -- as I'm sure we'll hear -- it will convey facts regarding existence of accounts, possession, authenticity, or location of certain assets, because the Receiver has shown with this reasonable particularity that when he sought production, you know, back.

When the requests for production were issued, he already knew this material existed.

Now, we know from a couple of cases, the In re Grand Jury case, which you both cited, that's at 670 F.3d, 1335, we know that it has to be specific enough, right, you can't do a blanket request because that would defeat the whole purpose.

But here it's pretty specific. The Receiver has pointed out that specific disclosure based on the 29C report when, I guess, Cole was trying to get a bank together, and so he knew these documents, he knows of them, he disclosed them, they were part of his disclosures in his financial report; so, based upon that, we have the request for production; so, the Receiver's not on a fishing expedition, he knows what's out there, and he's asking for these documents.

So I will sum it up by saying I have two concerns here that would defeat any Fifth Amendment invocation:

One is voluntary production of waiver argument, under cases like Point Break and Fisher and Sala, right, from the Southern District here, and then the other one is, there's a Foregone Conclusion Doctrine that's applicable here because we know these documents were produced.

So I am compelled, based upon this case law, it seems, to find that any production $I$ require would not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment, but maybe, again, I'm missing something, and I know it's a sensitive issue, so I thought it best to hold a brief oral argument today and give you an opportunity on behalf of Mr. Cole to tell me if there's something in that recitation that $I$ put forth now that is wrong or perhaps you think one of these things is inapplicable.

So, I'll turn to you, Ms. Schein.
MS. SCHEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

And I appreciate Your Honor having reviewed the submissions, and we're all familiar with the case law, Fisher, Hubbell, and the In re Grand Jury, which are controlling here.

So with regard to the exhibit that the Receiver attached which sets forth some financial information of Mr. Cole, that's also prepared from August of 2019 . So the motion to compel is, as of now, in 2022, and that's what we're opposing, is compelling Mr. Cole to produce documents currently.

So, in August of 2019, that was the case, but from

August of 2019 until August of 2020 when this case first began, that's a full year of -- and have been the same type of sentiment, finances change, accounts could be closed, accounts could be opened, assets could be used to pay household expenses, if there's -- and particularly, in 2020, in March of 2020 the COVID pandemic began and a lot of businesses closed down and there was severe financial complications from the pandemic.

So, to sum that up, things change. So to ask -- to compel Mr. Cole now to provide financial information, updated financial information, would require him to really testify to the existence of bank accounts or other assets, the existence, the location of them, and that he has them, and that is just what the Hubbell Supreme Court said is not permitted and Mr. Cole is permitted to assert his Fifth Amendment, you know, act of production rights not to produce these documents as for now.

The Receiver can't say, Well, you know that -- let's say, hypothetically, that the Bank Account A exists and we know that Mr. Cole has the documents in his possession. Let's take a step back and look at the In re Grand Jury case in Eleventh Circuit. There the Government had in its possession -- they had executed a search warrant -- and they had this digital data in their possession. It was encrypted and they couldn't open it, and there was hearing with regard to
the encryption that isn't in that case.
There the Court said we can't compel -- even though the Government had the digital data in its possession, we can't compel the defendant to unencrypt it because that would violate his Fifth Amendment right, so that would be the first.

Here we have a case called Hubbell, where there was immunity granted, documents were produced, and then a criminal case was brought. And the Court set most of those, specifically, Hubbell asked the Court to -- there was the right not to produce these documents.

The documents called for in Hubbell are the same as to here. There are classes of assets, bank records, properties, you know, all sorts of assets. And although, yes, they were actually existing in August 2019 financial statements, it would be akin to having Mr. Cole sit for a deposition to be asked:

Do you still have Bank Account A? Where are the documents of Bank Account A?

Can you produce the rest of those documents? What is left in that account?

It's the same thing as him testifying, except if you read the case law, that would be what we rely upon, we are opposing this motion to compel because it is quite similar to the Hubbell case, and the 2019 -- August 2019 financial statements can't be a substitution for what the Court has said, is that the Government must know the existence of the
documents, like in Fisher.
In Fisher, the taxpayer had given the tax returns and the underlying accounting documents to his lawyer. The Government asked the lawyer to produce those documents. The lawyer said, I can't. So then the taxpayer objected on act of production grounds.

So the Government said, Those tax returns are in the lawyer's office, along with the underlying accounting documents, and those are the records we seek. We know they exist, we know where they are, they're in the lawyer's office. That was Fisher.

Hubbell was different. And Hubbell is just like this case, because we're talking about a full year before this case was brought, and part of the year. The pandemic had started in March of 2020. And I would say, you know, looking at this, at Exhibit 1, things change, and the order for Mr. Cole to respond, his response is testimonial in nature, and that's what the act of production doctrine protects against, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me ask you something, Ms. Schein, and that's an interesting argument. Really, your argument is focused more on the now absence of reasonable particularity and the foregone conclusion theory because of the passage of time.

So what you're pointing out is, perhaps, in 2019, there may have been a true sense of universe of documents, but now we are moving farther from that, and it's starting to take on a
testimonial nature, again, because it's not so foregone.
I guess my frank question to you is -- let's take up a hypothetical. There are two Par Funding entities here that are being scrutinized, and that's Beta Abigail, LLC, and ALB Management, LLC. And we know that the FDIC disclosures, if I understand them, noted that there was a number -- or there had been a lot of assets that had been amassed and may be related, perhaps, to some of those entities.

You know, what I'm curious about, Fisher talks a little bit about not needing to know the exact location of specific documents. It just seems odd that we have a situation where, let's say, the Receiver becomes aware of a current asset that is being held by Mr. Cole and, ultimately, he's asking or requesting production of documents within that asset.

The argument that you're making, I believe, is, Well, that asset may have since depreciated or the value of that asset may have changed and, therefore, we no longer have that foregone conclusion.

And then my response might be, Well, yes, valuations may have changed, the balance sheet on something may have changed, but its existence has not.

And so, to me, you know, I think about -- and I know you want me to travel more down the Hubbell line, but I wonder, why would it -- we have voluntary production and previously generated, Cole has, and maybe just an updated version of that
previously generated document, that would be one argument, I guess, that would be a waiver.

But, alternatively, I don't think that -- at least the way I read In re Grand Jury -- that the Receiver would have to know the financial situation before asking.

He knows that there was production of those financial years 2019 to these certain assets, sure, I don't doubt that's what you pointed out; but whether it would have changed the direction, maybe he doesn't any longer own some of them, maybe he sold some of them, maybe some of them are no longer as valuable as they were, but certainly, it seems to me, that there's been a showing that we know, you know, the Receiver knows that those documents are out there, they're updated differently, but they're out there.

What would you say to that, is that like that reasonable particularity, you know, condition a little too thin?

MS. SCHEIN: Your Honor, I think we have to be, at least, help be guided by the case law, and the case law says that if the production is testimonial in nature. So, as you point out, assets of Mr. Cole ask if it's a foregone conclusion. So the fact that this was -- this stated assets back in 2019, and that we all acknowledge that the stated assets -- someone suggested -- can change in a year, particularly, a year that includes the pandemic. That's the
issue.

The issue is not the doctrine at the time or documents that the Receiver can obtain from a different source, a third party. The issue is the documents that are being requested from Mr. Cole. So, for instance, the Receiver already has millions of documents, and it's my understanding the Receiver has Beta Abigail, and Capital Source 2000, and ALB Management, they have all these documents.

And they have them up to the nature of -- and when the receivership was disbanded in December of 2020 -- or 2021 -- I can't keep track at this point -- but in any event, the Receiver can then took over CS2000 and ALB Management, so already they have all those documents.

Those aren't the documents that they're seeking. They're seeking documents of -- they're seeking Mr. Cole to, in effect, testify, Yes, I have these documents and this is where -- and they're in my possession and this is the state of the affairs now. So that's what they're seeking.

It's not the documents that are part of the receivership. So that's -- you know, the case law says it's not the documents themself that the Fifth Amendment has the production doctrine concerns.

It's the act of producing the documents, it's the act of verifying, Yes, $I$ have the documents, and yes, they're in my possession. That's the issue here, and that's what the case
law, you know, discusses, and that's --
THE COURT: Sure, but the problem is -- the problem is, we know he has them. I mean, we know -- page three of the reply, we're looking at numerous, specific disclosures in a financial report to the FDIC. I mean, we're not talking about, you know, a minor disclosure; which was in seeking to, hopefully, you know, pursue other financial opportunities in an effort to acquire a bank.

And we know that those specific disclosures are found by the Receiver as he's going through this Interagency Biographical Report, and we know he disclosed, specifically, his ownership of certain property in Philadelphia with current mortgage balance and market values of the property.

He discloses about ownership of interest for ALB Management, Beta Abigail's, Capital Source, Florida Memory Lane, Complete Business Solutions, and Full Spectrum.

He put out -- ultimately, disclosed the beneficial current value of the interest in several companies -- again, many which $I$ just mentioned -- and security interests of \$186,000 with Fidelity.

We know that he disclosed debts owed to him from Florida Memory Lane in the amount 81,000 and then the $401-\mathrm{K}$ from Fidelity. So, these are quite specific. All of these disclosures, we know they exist. There is no testimonial component; to the extent there even is one, it's been waived
because it's been voluntarily disclosed.
So if the Receiver asks for documents related to these types of categories, or assets, that would satisfy the line of cases on the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine because these have already not only been produced, but we know that, for example, had he sold or has any sort of new mortgage balance -- to use your example, on the Philadelphia property -- that doesn't suddenly transform; voluntarily disclosed documents to the FDIC don't now get new Fifth Amendment protection because the value of some of those documents may have changed.

I mean, the reality is the documents are what they are. We know that they exist because they have been disclosed. So questions regarding those documents which we know about were even voluntarily turned over would not in any sort of decision-making process in the mind, as we know when we talk about the example of the lockbox and things of that nature; we know that at that point there has been already that type of disclosure in the voluntary production to the FDIC.

So now to say that this is showing or exhibiting mental state to the level that's testimonial and attaches -- or the Fifth Amendment protection attaches, I think, are ancillary to the case law, would be a run-around or a net run-around the whole reasonable particularity standards, because everything here, for example, the categories I've read, in his own financial report, what he did disclose about Par Funding, the
property he has. We know that documents containing his disclosures are there, that's what the spreadsheet told me he is holding. He doesn't have to go and pull documents from his bank account or call Fidelity and get the updated balance, he already turned them over.

So any documents that are seeking those same categories but may within them have updated financial numbers, to me, doesn't seem, at least, to transform the data in those documents into a new Fifth Amendment challenge. And that's my concern; and if any exists, and hear the response from Receiver's counsel on point, because the argument really is a nuanced one, but I understand it, is that this is now reinvigorated with Fifth Amendment protection, you would delay this particular disclosure and what's happening today financially with Mr. Cole.

So, from 2019, and we're now in 2022, so I can see this argument maybe, you know, really becoming stronger the more time that passes; like if you have documents from someone's bank situation 15 years ago, understanding that we've had a lot of turmoil with COVID, I can see why these balance sheets are going to be different.

But I don't seem to find any supporting case law that a difference within the substance of the document itself would transform that part into a new Fifth Amendment problem.

But again, I want to make sure I'm not missing -- now,
what's the Receiver's view on this?
MR. ALFANO: We don't think there's anything
substantive that has changed -- or should there be, because Mr. Cole disclosed these assets in September of 2019 and in July of 2020, less than a year later, on the subject with that -- you know, so the fact that -- I mean, I would hope that when we discover more about these assets in over the last 18 months, or so, there hasn't been any changes in his assets.

I think that's important. And I think the fact we're now in 2022 is not as important as, theoretically, legally, he was supposed to have not done anything to transfer, impair, or otherwise diminish these assets.

But we know the documents exist. We know he owns a home in Philadelphia, that's evidenced by -- we know he has a mortgage, that's evidenced by a mortgage. We know he had accounts, and that's evidenced by accounts.

And what we're asking for are the documents relating to the assets that he disclosed at the time, and he claimed at the time that this was the entirety of his assets, so I think we're on solid ground in terms of making this requirement.

What I don't understand from Ms. Schein is whether he's prepared to concede that we can have the documents at least up through September of 2019, or is there some argument -- and not updated ones -- or is there some argument that we can't have any documents at all because of the act of production?

THE COURT: But let me ask first, that's a point, I don't know. Ms. Schein, do you have a position on that?

Again, obviously, I know that the Receiver wants, you know, guidance on the motion to compel. I don't know that anything further, there's any disclosures, turnovers, certain substantive documents prior to the assets solely, but what's your position on that?

MS. SCHEIN: First, I think we have to clarify for the Receiver that documents were not produced with the form that the Receiver attached as an exhibit, that's first and foremost.

But this is a listing of the finances, a snapshot in time, August of 2019, that there weren't documents produced.

So in order for Mr. Cole to comply with the requests, they have to take action. Let's say, you know, hypothetically, he'd had to go online and type in, you know, "Cole data" to get the documents. But that's Cole, being the Eleventh Circuit has said that that act of production in the In re Grand Jury case.

And so the current documents -- here, before we take -from the very beginning of August of 2020, in that year, financial conditions -- let's say, hypothetically to this argument -- have changed substantially and maybe the account doesn't exist, maybe all the living expenses during October 2020. We don't know if it's current, and the Receiver doesn't know, and I don't know it, but it would require Mr. Cole to take action conduct and, of course, and in some
cases he's sort of asking if he does have them; Oh, I have the documents sitting on my desk and I'm going to give them to the Receiver. That's not the case.

But, you know, documents have to be obtained by Mr. Cole in order for him to provide them. So he has to obtain the documents, whether it's from a bank or some third-party financial institution. So there were not documents provided with this financial report in August of 2019, things have changed.

In order to respond to the motion to compel for the production of documents there is a testimonial aspect to producing these documents, and that is covered by the Fifth Amendment and the case law supports that, particularly, in the Eleventh Circuit, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Alfano, do you want to add anything?
MR. ALFANO: I do, Your Honor. Well --
THE COURT: Apparently, there is no middle ground in terms of like a limited production. It's kind of, to me, an all-or-nothing thing. I'm prepared to rule on the issue because it has been -- some time has passed in regards to, and I wanted to brief it to say, as I understand it the nature of this, and you, and Ms. Schein, and your clients, but it just -again, it may be a philosophical difference on the applicability of the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine, as well as the voluntary nature.

I just -- I cannot imagine, for example, I think if you took this argument to its logical conclusion, you know, you'd only be -- you'd be trapped in a snapshot in time, right. You would never been able to obtain documents, truthfully, unless you got them right after they were voluntarily disclosed or you became immediately aware of them and they were immediately requested, with any sort of case, in either financial circumstances, or otherwise, would then require to re-boot the testimonial aspect of the documents, I don't read the case law or parse it out that way.

I think, though, what it does is it tries to set guardrails to prevent a Government fishing expedition in the Grand Jury case, and others, by generally requesting categories of documents. But we know that it's been voluntarily produced to the FDIC in seeking to try to loan or get involved in a bank.

And that's the source of the information of something that's been voluntarily disclosed. There is really no -- in my view, at least -- with respect to a testimonial aspect that attaches when you know what's coming.

I mean, whether or not it may be slightly updated, to me, doesn't necessarily change the equation, because, really, the case law is more focused on reasonable certainty or, at least knowing what's out there so that there's not a bunch of guesswork being done by the parties, and so simply changing
the valuation of something -- and I mean some of these things, truthfully, I think are not a concern, the mortgage, you know, we got a note, we know the house is owned, I mean, these are pretty obvious things, right.

I don't know that a lot of these documents are really requiring us to do some sleuthing. We know they're out there, it's just getting the paperwork on them. But there are some that have changed in value, a $401-\mathrm{K}$, or whatever it may be, I fail to see how that valuation changes that existence of that account, per se, is now once again shielded by Fifth Amendment protection.

It's knowing that that account exists that triggers your ability to use the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine. Ms. Schein, I don't know what your take on it is, at least that's how the case law seems to break.

MS. SCHEIN: Your Honor, what if the account doesn't exist any longer?

THE COURT: Well, that's a good point.
MS. SCHEIN: It's a closed account.
THE COURT: Let's say it's a closed account, right. Let's say it's a closed account, then why wouldn't we have a document saying it's a closed account? I mean, we have a request for production, right, and show me that you have any closed accounts, operational accounts, based upon what the -if there's any liquidated accounts, then I think, absolutely,
you would just simply show documentation that the account has been closed.

I can't speak without saying, you can't make them, if you don't have them, it's not in your custody, care, and control, and we got to make sure that we don't sit here and truly send you on that type of fishing expedition.

I would ask counsel, I would assume, that if it no longer exists, it's a closed account, liquidated, making up for the shortfall in income due to COVID, then you can request it, and then an account showing that there's no longer -- for example, let's say, hypothetically, ALB Management liquidated it, or sold it, or transferred it, right, Mr. Alfano, you'd say, Great, just to document facts; right?

MR. ALFANO: We would take those documents, and then we would move to -- whatever the next step might be, in terms of investigating this particular document.

THE COURT: Correct. You know, I think that's the reality, we don't want to kind of get ahead of ourselves. I think it's more about trying just what's there, a snapshot, and I think at that point in time, if there is, you know, closure of accounts, that they don't exist, that we will have to, at that point, make a determination as to what they want to ask for in response to something, and we can litigate that if need be, but I think, for now, if there's something that's no longer a growing concern, or it's been liquidated or sold, that could
be reflected in the documentation and then that answers the request; right?

MS. SCHEIN: Your Honor, I just want to add, let's say Mr. Cole doesn't have documents, that he has to go online and put it in -- and then that doesn't have the documents, that in and of itself is testimonial in nature. That's the production. It's not the documentation. It's the cases that distinguish between the documents themselves and the act of producing the documents; and I think that's the difference here, the intention here, it's the act of producing these documents.

ALB Management, Beta Abigail, and those other companies that are part of the receivership entities, they have all those documents, so they're not talking about Beta Abigail and ALB Management, and the other ones, so on.

We're talking about a small subset, that production testimony, I don't want the accounts. I used to have my expenses testimonial, that's testimony. So the document production is testimonial, and that's what the basis is here, Your Honor.

I don't want to be remiss and not raise it, because, I believe, you know, pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court, that the act of production is applicable to these facts.

THE COURT: And does the Receiver want to respond?
Again, I haven't -- I think we're --

MR. ALFANO: I do, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- I think we're overstating not only the case law, but I think that that's not necessarily how it works. I mean, the fact that there's an asset where he's turning it over does not become testimonial when we know that he already has that bank account, has said assets, he's already disclosed them.

So on one end, there may be a voluntary waiver due to the prior production of the CBSG, but on the other side of that, there's also a situation where we know that these exist, we know they exist. We know he's got these accounts, we know where they are, the location. There is no testimonial aspect to turning those over because there is nothing, in terms of mental impression or decision-making.

It is wrong, I think, to say that this is the simple act of putting in a password is now transformed into testimonial. In fact, that line of argument is somewhat rejected by the case law. It's really -- we know it's already in existence. We know the bank statement is in existence.

We know he has a bank account, it's been disclosed.
So provided with that doesn't transform the act of sending it over is not a situation where the mental impressions are being exhibited or utilized from a testimonial perspective.

But go ahead, Mr. Alfano, you wanted to...
MR. ALFANO: Thank you, Your Honor. I will just state
that no law firm's alike. We may have to go in a file drawer and pull out documents isn't akin to, you know, basically, the schedule, that's not testimonial.

And while Mr. Cole may believe that we have -quote/unquote -- all the documents, the Receiver's not that confident. And it's absolutely in the Receiver's right to require him to provide these documents; and frankly, it benefits the investors, because otherwise we have to spend a lot of time, a lot of money with third-party subpoenas, subpoenas to banks, trying to analyze data from other sources; and, you know, before we do that, or in conjunction with doing that, we'd like to have baseline information that Mr. Cole voluntarily disclosed -- quote/closed quote -- all of his assets in 2019.

And I think we're actually entitled to it, and I think we'd be remiss in our responsibility to try and recover any last-minute investors in so doing this.

THE COURT: Yeah, I mean, look, we have to remember the genesis behind this is the -- and that's why I mentioned, really, more from a hypothetical issue, but the Beta Abigail, ALB Management point of the motion was related to the co-mingling concern. I mean, that's really what this all blows from, is that that being the Receiver's view, to follow the money here and figure out, as the financial report indicated, in August 31st, 2019, there was, roughly, 7.7 million in assets
that he had amassed; and so that, really, where this whole request comes from is trying to square-up some of these numbers; and I don't believe -- and I'm sure we can all agree -- that whatever you were to get is not what he meant with the inquiry, that I suspect there will be other questions raised by whatever is produced.

But to require the expedition and the time and money spent to -- of course, to the detriment of the Receiver's -excuse me -- of the investors -- because that's the Receiver's time and money that ultimately needs to be compensated. We're trying to go the course, right, that the information that we know is from the FDIC report and was voluntarily turned over at one point already; and then we can work from there before we're dealing with trying to go into other banks and get, you know, third-party subpoenas out there and whatnot.

So, you know, look, I think the biggest point there, Ms. Schein, is that a lot of the arguments about, you know, decrypting and putting in passwords, they don't rise to the level of testimonial in the sense that they are physical acts by opposing counsel, so it is kind of the example of the lockbox key, which, you know, to me, that is pretty on point.

I don't think the act of collecting -- which is physical -- triggers the testimonial aspects of the mental impressions or thoughts that would be required to have them withhold the documents that we especially know exist.

So I will say this, I think at this point, you know, obviously, the Court will write something on it because I think it's just important that we make it clear, but I am inclined to grant the motion to compel based upon what I heard, and I just want to go through and check my own notes before formally doing so in an order.

And, Ms. Schein, and the stay is of such an order so that you can take it to the Eleventh Circuit, I wanted to check with you that is still something that you are requesting, because I will, respectfully, decline to do such a thing. I think the right way to do it is go to the Eleventh Circuit.

I mean, ordinarily, if $I$ thought it was a very close call and it's going to open the door to something truly testimonial and problematic, I would be more hesitant, but I think the case law -- at least in my view -- is pretty clear in that truthfully a lot of these documents are known to the parties, maybe not as Mr. Alfano says in such detail as Mr. Cole thinks they are, based on what's been produced already, but $I$ don't think it's a situation here where, you know, we're opening up a Pandora's box of documents and really implicating the Fifth Amendment to a level that I would be compelled to stay the implementation of the ruling.

Now, I don't have a problem, for example, if I grant the motion to compel, require these documents be, you know, turned over by a date certain, which is what $I$ would do, and
then, in the interim, of course, the Eleventh Circuit is free to stay my order, if they wish. I'm just concerned also that, you know, we are -- hopefully, we are at the last phases of this case, motions for disgorgement have hit, responses are going to be due soon, other than dealing with that phase of the case -- and again, it's only for certain players because we have settled and I've entered judgment as to numerous defendants, so we're down really to a core group of individuals here who are contesting disgorgement but have already stipulated as to liability; and before I rule on that, right, I can't get the Receiver to wind down, and I'm desperate, quite honestly, to get the Receiver in a position where they know what they have amassed and accrued and can start working the formulas to see how much they could return to Receivers.

Now, I think this works a little bit because, from what I'm hearing, this is a duel-track type issue. On the one hand, we have the SEC, which is going for a disgorgement with these individuals, but the Receiver can at least do their job in collecting. I got a motion this morning already on Kingdom Logistics, I believe, that I need to address. So they're still doing their job to collect, at the Court's request.

But honestly, this is kind of right in the middle of that, right, getting documents from one of the principal players who is contesting disgorgement would be valuable for the Receiver to figure out if there are other sources of assets
that ultimately came from Par Funding and made their way to non-Par Funding, or non-CBSG-related accounts been sold by Mr. Cole, or others, the Court needs to know that.

And so, I think that this is the right way to go
forward, but I would ask you, Ms. Schein, are you still -- just so I'm aware, because I will, you know -- I want to, as I'm writing it, is to make sure $I$ fully understand your position, are you still seeking a stay or are you intending -- and you may intend a stay, one way or the other, I don't know.

MS. SCHEIN: Yes, Your Honor. I just wanted to -- I thank you, Your Honor, I just wanted to put something else on the record to correct the record.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. SCHEIN: The financial reports that the Receiver attached as Exhibit 1 to their reply to compel, in it there's a list of $\$ 6,370,651$ that's listed under proprietary interest and other securities.

Just to be clear, that amount was put down as part of CS2000 and the entities that were taken over by the Receiver, so that's something that was part of what might have been, you know, in his financial statement.

But since it's been taken over by the Receiver, that was MCA's business that he had with Bill Bromley, and that's been part of the receivership after the expansion of the receivership, so that doesn't -- that's not part of these -- of
this financial -- these assets that's in CS2000, and that's part of the confusion -- just to be clear on that -- so that's 6-million-300-some-thousand dollars.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. SCHEIN: Okay.
THE COURT: All right.
MS. SCHEIN: With regard to your question, I'm sorry, I hope I answered your question.

THE COURT: No, no, no, I just want to make sure -- I mean, again, I completely understand. I mean, it's your client, if he wants to go ahead and take it up, that's why, I mean, I'm not going to rule from the bench, I want to write something so that you have something and at least my reasoning -- right or wrong -- is explained, so I totally understand.

MS. SCHEIN: Yes, Your Honor. I think that I may take it up, this is a very discreet issue of the Fifth Amendment, and, you know, it's an issue that I have gone through based on the case law and the Receiver has their view; and I think, you know, perhaps the Eleventh Circuit might want to impart their view on this.

THE COURT: I would say, one way or the other, it would be beneficial that you take it up, in the sense that it could give us even more clarity on the law on this case, right, so I -- and I don't know how many cases have done it.

We know that a lot of them derived more from Grand Jury
issues and Government issues, perhaps, even though the Receiver context, it could be all the more important for them to opine, so I -- I mean, quite frankly, I'd welcome it, that if they get involved they might send us another case, especially for those of us who are in this case, it will give us some clarity, so I'm good either way.

MS. SCHEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else the
Receiver needed to chime in before I conclude?
I don't want to keep you guys too much longer. I wanted to make sure I wasn't missing anything before I ruled on this, and I wanted to hear from Ms. Schein.

Is there anything else that we need to address at this point? I think I did have this set for a status because, truthfully, it was really more about this discovery and production issue, and I know that everyone is working to get ready on this for disgorgement anyway -- I don't want to interrupt everyone's preparation because those will be coming up soon; and I, also, I will say that, aside from the Receiver motion that's been filed, the motion for trial, which I need to rule on, so...

But I know that things are moving towards the next big phase of the case, and I expect in the next month or two we will be having some hearings on that. I will say -- I know I don't have everybody here, but I certainly think that when we
get to the disgorgement phase that $I$ want everyone live again. I do this to save everybody time and money, but I think I'm starting to leaning towards to having live hearings; certainly, when we get into disgorgement, I want to have people present. I don't want to do much, if anything, of that significance on Zoom, so I just wanted you to get kind of head's up that I'll be scheduling that when we get those motions ripe.

But is there anything else from the Receiver's end, guys, that needs to touch on before I conclude?

MR. ALFANO: Your Honor, the only thing, we are scheduled at the end of this month to provide our update for the first quarter of 2022, and we'll provide certainly that financial information, in terms of the assets of the receivership, and other data, as well as information that would be current as of the date that we filed. And we hope to have that to you before the end of this month.

We think that that would be, obviously, helpful for the Court and for the parties, it could be best to understand which assets are included in the receivership at this point and the value of those assets.

THE COURT: Yeah, yeah, and I don't want to get -- and also, we have had -- the last report had, you know, quite a bit of expansion, in my recollection, not only quite a bit of expansion, right, but I've listed a lot of litigation stays from the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia, so I'm looking
forward to kind of getting an update on any steps the Receiver's had in collections, as well; and hopefully, you know, I don't know necessarily where we stand on the exact balance, $I$ don't want to quote you on it today, but I look forward to seeing kind of where in the shortfall is and how close we're at maybe getting to -- I don't want to call it a magic number -- but fine or if that's to make the Receiver's holes that's always been our goal.

MR. ALFANO: Your Honor, I have that information, generally.

THE COURT: Do you mind, if you can you share that with me for my notes?

MR. ALFANO: Not at all, of course, Your Honor, I can make sure we provide that. So we currently stand at a total of 165 million dollars in both cash and real and personal property. Cash, all of which is unencumbered, stands at 105,000; the personal property stands at, approximately, 60, and we believe that that property, particularly the real estate, is conservatively valued. We're using generally acquisition prices as the value.

What that number does not include is any valuation for any accounts receivable, rather, you know, merchants and counter-parties were not -- we know they exist and we're pursuing them and be happy to talk about the collection activities in our report, and otherwise, but we're not, you
know, ascribing any value to that right now because those are not actual cash or, you know, real or personal property assets.

It doesn't include the jet that the Government has seized. It doesn't include the brokerage account that the Government seized. We think it's, approximately, somewhere between 15 and 20 million dollars.

It does not include the face value of any life insurance policies. It doesn't include the value of any third-party claims, and doesn't include the fraudulent conveyance claim down in Texas.

And there has been a number of merchants and counter-parties since the Court has lifted the litigation injunction that we have pursued who have entered into settlement agreements with the Receiver, and at times, although our preference is to try to get a settlement in a lump sum, for obvious reasons, at times, in order to facilitate that, those counter-parties have asked for payments over time.

And we currently have somewhere between 10 and 15 million dollars of payments over time that are due to the receivership through our -- you know, through these settlement agreements. And we're very careful with the settlement agreements -- to make it clear -- that if there's already an existing judgment in Philadelphia, for instance, or some existing, in the status quo, that if there is a default on a particular agreement, we go back to where we started, with the
only understanding is they get credit for that.
And so far, I think we've been fortunate, in terms of having counter-parties honor commitments to make it.

Generally, Your Honor, you know, at a high level, that's where we stand.

THE COURT: Yeah, I mean, it sounds -- and if you could remind me again, kind of -- I hate to put a total on it, but -and I don't have my reports and notes in front of me, so I will get to what our kind of end goal was, where are we at, in terms of full recoupment of having a shortfall? I know some of this gets you deals to perhaps make up for it by way of a disgorgement, but $I$ don't know how realistic that will be, even if those judgments are issued, collections, and all that, challenges.

Do you have a sense of -- and again, I know it's hard, because right now, just by my numbers, without including the -you said, the 105 million, conservative, on the 15 million real estate side, for sure, given the way things are going lately market-wise, but, you know, you're not even including any sort of other claims in that, and let's just say he's added a jet, debits, you know, to maybe close to 185 million -- still a little conservative number -- and I agree with you, trying to count and include settlement amounts in the future is too precarious, I wouldn't want to let, you know, investors think they're going to recoup certainly on 15 million; that's our
hope, obviously, at the high end, perfect scenario, we know that will probably happen with those folks that have settled out and certainly can be collected, will.

But where -- where do you see us, in terms of our ultimate goal? I mean, I think it was 300-and-some million, but I may be misstating that.

Do you know, Mr. Alfano, kind of where our baseline number was when we all started?

MR. ALFANO: Your Honor, I think I can maybe answer it this way, in terms of the information that the Receiver provided in a declaration on, $I$ believe it was last Friday, to the Court; that with respect to the Par Funding entity -keeping in mind we have CS2000 and other, you know, other receivership entities -- but with respect to the principal Par Funding/CBSG entity -- and this would include the agent funds that were responsible for taking money from investors as well -- the total of investor principal for CBSG/Par Funding, and the various agent funds, I believe, was 550 million dollars, and that Par Funding returned to investors 300 million.

THE COURT: So, based on that, you're looking at, you know, let's say, 150 -- or 200 -- let me see, you said it was 550 million?

MR. ALFANO: It was 550 minus 300 .
THE COURT: Okay. Right. And that was what they
returned, so everything that we are working on now -- you know, for lack of a better word -- it's towards that 250 million dollars -- I mean, I want to make sure because this is the problem -- you have to understand, make sure -- listen, I understand, Ms. Berlin, FDIC has its own involvement, okay, so we need to try to put this in layman terms, because $I$ get, as you all know, 50 e-mails a day on this stuff, so I'd like to know from a very nuts and bolts perspective what we're dealing with today, in terms of real numbers.

So, Mr. Alfano, as you were saying, that amount that was left behind, do you kind of calculate that or connect that with what you currently been able to recover?

MR. ALFANO: I do, with a couple of exceptions, Your Honor, because some of --

THE COURT: Tell me what those are.

MR. ALFANO: Sure. We have the CS2000 is receivership entity, we collected cash and assets in connection with CS2000.

I don't know yet about the treatment of the two Multi-Strategy Funds, which were ABFP, Magnosi (phonetic) Multi-Strategy Funds, which were not pure MCA funds, but had an MCA component, and had other components, either life insurance policies or, in one case, a very liquid stock investment of about a million dollars. I'm not certain how those would be treated.

But in terms of -- just in terms of a larger picture
for the bulk of the Merchant Cash Advance, we understand that, you know, you know, 550 million was raised from investors and 300 million has been returned; whether that was denominated as a return of principal or interest, we're not making that distinction, but just in terms of dollars in and dollars back from the investment, again, with the principal companies.

THE COURT: Right. I mean, look, I think, to state it another way, obviously, there's a lot of things we're not really sure about. I mean, you've mentioned a number of them, and we're not including, not only the other entities, CS2000, and everything else, not only situations with the 100 and -excuse me -- third-party claims and advance claims, but I think it's important, you know -- look, I'm a kind of a glass-half-full kind of guy, and so, you know, one of the things that needs to be reflected as we continue to move forward to disgorgement, I would like to have a moment where we can at least look back on the work that the Court and Receiver have done in terms of recovery and recognize, $I$ think, as far as these types of recovery efforts go -- I don't think there's any other way to deem this at least some sort of a success in recouping funds.

I mean, if you're working off these numbers -- and I know that we get different sets of numbers depending on who you ask, so I understand that, but trying to put my hands around when this case, hopefully, within the end of this calendar year
is my hope comes to an end and the Receiver is finally determining pay-outs -- and that's going to change because they're going to continue to see how things come in with the settlements, et cetera, but -- and again, you correct me if I'm wrong -- 550 million, we know, and we know -- who knows how they deem the 300 million, it could have been principal, it could have factoring interest, whatever it is, you know, however they want to do it with the MCA business, 300 million went back to the investors, and so we had a shortfall of 250 million. I mean, and if you really want to break it down as simple as that, I think that's true.

And so when you look at 250 million, you're telling me today that you have 105 million in cash and 60 million, conservatively, appraised assets, I have to believe -understanding that, you know, if you do the very rudimentary math -- you're at a shortfall of 250 minus 150 or 190, I mean, I'm just doing very basic math -- that yes, that is a big amount of money still out there that is not really being captured, but again, it's not taking into account a number of other funding or recovery sources, including, you know, possible fraudulent conveyance issues, third-party claims, collection activities, you know, other funds that we're not including in there, all of that, you know, and things like, you know, liquidation of the debt, for example.

So there are a number of other items that we cannot put
the dollar amount yet that $I$ think it sounds like -- trying to be conservative about it -- we'll take a chunk out of what remains from the -- let's say 250 million shortfall when money was returned to investors.

So is that -- my summary there, Mr. Alfano -- I don't want to oversimplify -- but is that a fair kind of recap of where we're at right now?

MR. ALFANO: Absolutely, Your Honor. Pardon my voice.
And I would invite Mr. Kolaya or Mr. Stumphauzer to, you know, to discuss that item as well, because certainly they are knowledgeable.

THE COURT: Sure, I would welcome -- I mean, I didn't set it up for a full status and I know the report's coming, and so there's more of a discovery, but it was an opportunity to talk to you guys and I like to see how things are going, and we're going to get it in writing soon, but do you guys agree kind of with -- again, $I$ know that I'm simplifying this big time, but the narrative here has mattered to me for a long time, because people have expressed -- really, the investors, who have expressed their doubts as to what we have done, or what we have accomplished, and know that they're not going to probably get their full return on investment back, they're not going to get their full principal back, et cetera.

But I'd like to telegraph to them the hard work that's been done by the Receiver, the invaluable work that's been
done, because these are not small numbers. I mean, over the course of -- and I forget, six years, I think, it's actually coming up now in July -- that over the course of two years, I think it needs to be said, that we have been able to marshal assets that they have the positive side of recovery, and that's not including what $I$ know you guys are still doing, because, you know, counter-party issues and merchant issues, I'm not putting a number on that right now, but I know that there's some positive cash flow on some of these other funds that we're still trying to quantify -- and, of course, none of this takes into account should there be any sort of disgorgement, either by way of -- not only disgorgement -- by the way, and I meant to mention this, Mr. Alfano, I don't know -- did this number work into it any of the disgorgement that has been agreed to by certain parties, the numbers, they're not -- sometimes people like to get out calculators and re-insert numbers -- does any of this number go to that, or you're not including any of that either; right?

MR. ALFANO: No, it's part -- part of it does, because the extent that there's been either turnover of property or cash payments, those were included as of April 15th.

But there's other commitments with respect to those settlements that haven't been -- that are not timely yet, so they'll be, hopefully, additional payments in the future made over time.

THE COURT: Mr. Kolaya, do you want to jump in and tell me if you want to take a step back if I'm missing something on that? But I think, look, that's another -- there is some sort of duplicitous issues by the settlements that have been reached by the SEC with certain of the defendants, and $I$ know that; and like you said, turning over the properties and stuff, but it doesn't stop it, if there's some money there, that it, hopefully, those are, pursuant to the settlement agreements, paid -- and I know that there's -- I've read them and reviewed them, there's a number of provisions ripe.

These sums are to be re-paid for the agreed-upon cases. I'm not looking at anything that's going to be litigated in the coming months, but it sounds like that's going to be included; and when you start adding that up, and everything else, I mean, I don't know how much will be left on the cutting room floor, but we are certainly heading in a very strong direction.

I never thought any investor would be able to make a full recovery on this case, it's just very difficult. No one ever wants to get their hopes up because we know how difficult these cases can be when it comes to unwinding all of these things, but it does sound like we're making some positive strides and we're going to come somewhat close, I mean, in terms of the recoverable we set when we started.

But do you agree with that assessment? What's your take on that?

MR. KOLAYA: Your Honor, I just want to make a few clarifications. From the 550 million raised minus the 300 million returned in principal and/or interest, that is only for Par Funding/Complete Business Solutions Group.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. KOLAYA: And the, approximately, 165 million that we have in cash and other assets, that's for all receivership entities, with some exception of Mr. Alfano's claim, so I just wanted to clarify that there is going to be a larger delta, because there is a balance owed on other receivership entities, for example, CS2000 and some of the other related Merchant Cash Advance companies.

I also wanted to clarify as well that we're simply talking about how much is owed to investors versus how much is recovered. I want to make very clear that the Receiver is not taking any position today or of any kind about how the amounts we collected may or may not impact disgorgement numbers that should be awarded against the defendants.

That's not our purview or our beliefs.
THE COURT: Sure, because there is going to have to be an accounting at that point, once we get through the disgorgement phase of the case.

Now, you mentioned the larger delta. It's so hard to tell, do we know what we're going to be recouping, if anything, these other funds, right, solely on Par Funding and CBSG.

What sense do you have on the other funds and how much more investors' principal's tied up in those funds? We have -I know there's a number of different funds, that's the policy, there's so many funding, you know, and most introductory meetings here and the footnotes have issues with so many different entities that are all interrelated in a receivership, do you have a sense of how much of a swing I'm going to get on that delta or we don't really necessarily know yet?

MR. KOLAYA: I'm not sure we have a precise number to give the Court today. If that's something the Court is interested in, we'll try to get that prepared for the May 1st report. The number is one, the other receivership was in the tens of millions of dollars, not in that same -- not in the millions.

THE COURT: Sure. And are those -- never had any return on those, right, meaning outside the Par Funding, they returned a portion, those were put in a receivership and we got them and they did great, right, to the extent that there was anything left there; is that right?

MR. KOLAYA: Well, so, for example, one of the funds is Multi-Strategy Funds, and that Multi-Strategy Fund not only invested in some of the other MCA businesses, it also held some life settlement policies and a few of those policies have, in fact, matured, so we have received some money back on that particular fund.

And as far as the other MCA funds, we are absolutely in discussions, negotiations, and in some cases litigation of merchants, certainly, to get those e-mails as well.

THE COURT: Sure. I mean, that's how most of the litigation's done, $I$ think, to get a total.

MR. KOLAYA: That's correct.

THE COURT: I mean, look, we know from multiple reports that when it comes to merchant cash-advance model and the recovery that the biggest challenge is that the top five, or whoever it is as the borrowers, aren't straight financial -- a lot of what we have, we've always said that from the beginning, that's what $I$ have been shown in multiple reports given the financial statements, some of the primary borrowers, right, that we've talked about, so it's going to be a challenge on that front to make that kind of recovery.

But I will say -- and again, I go back to my other point -- I'll wait, obviously, for the May lst report, but I think for purposes of just putting a bow on it today, even though we want to be careful in how we condition and explain how things are going, okay, it is important -- for example, when we walk into the disgorgement phase of the proceedings, I think it is important that we at least have found a very macro level analysis of where we stand.

We are kind of, I think, in the fourth quarter of the game here, we are in a position where we got through the
liability phase, we've settled on certain defendants, we have a quarter of the case left and it is very important. We have to closely analyze all the arguments that are forthcoming from Ms. Schein. So all that's going to come in, we're going to have hearings on that.

Once we get through that, though, I think the reality is back to the Receiver, right; I mean, once the Court has ruled on all that, that we have disclosure of whatnot, we're here to give you guys the bandwidth you need to wind it down, or at least begin working the numbers, right, because I know that the numbers may be garnished a long time, but you'll certainly be trying to at least figure out -- as you guys have said, through the investors, right -- that's what you work on and how you're doing that, what I do on the disgorgement, and I know you guys are going to keep trying to collect on the merchant side as much as you can, or any other assets that you may be able to procure, but $I$ want to kind of walk away at least with the understanding that we are on this, and that it's always been known, but we have to also acknowledge that it's not a number to laugh at, I mean, it really isn't.

I mean, we've done a lot of work to get these coiffures as full as possible for the investors; and that the investors, I think, should know that, so we're not spinning our gears with merchants, that there's been plenty that's covered and there's more to come, we'll see how far we can get, but I know you guys
can get us there.
So, is there anything else you guys wanted on the Receiver side, any other updates?

MR. ALFANO: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. All right.
MR. KOLAYA: Your Honor, the only other thing I would want to do is just backtrack for a moment the motion that's on for today.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. KOLAYA: As somebody who practices in this district quite a bit and has a number of discovery hearings with the magistrate judges who particularly handle these issues are fairly persistent on $37(a)(5)(A)$, which is the mandatory fee-shifting for a motion when there's a failure to produce documents. Did Your Honor want to address that today or subsequently?

THE COURT: Yeah, it's a good point, because I know that you guys have addressed that and you've made that request. You know, it's a pretty -- as you know, under Rule 37, it's not discretionary, I mean, in a way, right; I mean, it's pretty straightforward, that there has to be that type of fee-shifting. And this is a matter that is litigated a little bit, obviously, the Receiver, you know, one thing that I think I have to incorporate in my order -- given that it is part of the request and traditionally with discovery matters $I$ will
make a finding of entitlement and then $I$ will supplement it later if I rule in your favor by way of affidavit.

But I think the bottom line that you're requesting is that the Court make a determination as to entitlement under Rule $37(a)(5)(A)$; right?

MR. KOLAYA: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, I will take a look at that as well because I think it's part and parcel of the discovery motion. And you know, we have so many handled by Judge Reinhart, but I also handled some of these myself, it's just faster, truthfully, than giving this to him and doing the report, I didn't want to waste everybody's time and money on that, it's like a level objection.

So, I'll find that anything that I write-up, but that's important, so thanks for flagging that for me.

MR. KOLAYA: Sure.
THE COURT: Was there anything else -- and, Ms. Schein, obviously, I'm not making any determinations on amounts, you know, but the reality is it's a simple discovery fee-shifting issue. I mean, it's pretty standard, you know that, but is there anything you want to add on that point?

MS. SCHEIN: There is, Your Honor, thank you.
I would say that the Fifth Amendment right, I don't believe that a person should be penalized and they should be fee-shifting the Fifth Amendment rights. Mr. Cole responded to
all the requests during the course of discovery.
This request, I advised him, it's a Fifth Amendment issue and he has the right and did follow-up and strongly object to the fee-shifting for someone asserting their Fifth Amendment constitutional right. So that's just as important $37(\mathrm{a})(5)$, because he has responded to discovery and throughout the proceedings. And if Your Honor would like, I will provide all of those responses, but --

THE COURT: No, I will -- I will -- let me just turn back to Mr. Kolaya, one thing, and that's why I don't want to make a ruling, so without necessarily double-checking, but, you know, there is Rule 37 and there's Rule 37. One of the things I want to double-check is objections to production, that implicates constitutional concerns like this are not perhaps the dilatory type of -- or boilerplate objections to production that we ordinarily see that definitely should trigger fees.

And so, I don't know, Ms. Schein, do you want to bring -- I understand Ms. Schein's point, perhaps, not run-of-the-mill discovery on these particular documents, and is there anything you want to add -- and I'm going to check it independently, but $I$ think if there's anything you want to add on that?

MR. KOLAYA: Your Honor, the only objections to $37(a)(5)(A)$ is if the moving parties failed to confer in good faith prior to making the motion, that's obviously not the
case.
The second is if the opposing parties' non-disclosure was substantially justified, we think Your Honor will rule in our favor and order the production, which, it appears that you will be, that the position was not justified.

And then third is other circumstances which make an award of expenses unjust. I'm not aware of any case law that says making an objection specifically because it's

Fifth Amendment grounds makes some part of expenses unjust.
Ultimately, the Receiver -- on behalf of the Receiver, the investors that had to incur these costs pursuant to documents that we're entitled to, so we think that the fee-shifting should be ordered in this case.

THE COURT: And I'll look at that, Ms. Schein. I mean, I want to check it. As we know, I think there's -- you know, there are different levels of discovery objection, and I agree with you, and I wanted to double-check, obviously, really, it's not a situation here that a slam-dunk on entitlement under 37.

But I will check it to make sure I feel comfortable that there should be that type of fee-shift and that I should award costs and attorneys fees in this particular discovery; because, again, $I$ note that there are situations, certainly, where it's not necessarily warranted.

And in a substantial justification, I will tell you partly why I wanted to have the hearing was on the papers -- I
read everything, and you pointed out a couple of nuanced things that were not argued, as you know, necessarily, in the papers in that detail, and so I have to have a finding for that range is a privilege issue. Ms. Schein knows that. If I do that -obviously, if I don't, then, obviously, there will be no payment of expenses under (5) (a); okay.

MS. SCHEIN: Thank you, Your Honor, I appreciate all that; and, of course, you know my position on the status of that, and we have expunged all discovery.

I just want to make one more comment, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sure, yeah, go ahead. Go ahead, yeah.
MS. SCHEIN: That the Receiver -- that the recovery, I just want to say that we will be submitting substantial papers on disgorgement.

THE COURT: Sure.
MS. SCHEIN: And I would just like to note -- this is my opinion, of course -- that the Receiver has collected a lot, and I -- in my view, it's due to the substantial underwriting that was done at the time the MCA business was operating, and at the time the Receiver shutdown the business there was at least 32 million dollars in the account at the time.

I just want to put that on the record, as I think those facts are important to note. But I thank Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, I bring it out, Ms. Schein, I think it's very important when we get to that phase of the litigation
that we, you know, we're going to need to be very careful, right, because the duplicative nature of disgorgement and ongoing collection is a concern for the Court.

I don't want to have a double-counting. I want to make sure that I get a good sense of what's already been turned over, what's been taken, and what necessarily -- and I think that we saw, for example -- and I think this is the date, I think in one of the introductory paragraphs of the SEC's motion -- they took great pains to point out that they don't want this to be -- for lack of a better word -- side show to be engaged in the lack of a sportsman sense, and they pointed out that what they want to do is they want to get a number, right, they want to get a number; and then once we get that number, then we can debate what has been collected in the Receiver's efforts and everything else.

And I'm going to try, I mean, I'll probably have some status conference before we get into the disgorgement hearing to set parameters as to how to create the record.

I intend to tell you briefly things to do, is just figure out what's should be disgorged now, what has already been collected that could offset that is certainly another argument, and I think we're going to have to talk about that, but I don't want to have a situation where I co-mingle them because that could be a situation where I come to the disgorgement amount and now, hopefully, that's already been
resolved in part, or you make an argument that some of that's already been taken; and if that's the case, then, obviously, we have to make adjustments when it comes to that.

But right now, $I$ think it's more of a legal and evidentiary aspect of figuring out the number, and then we can go from there about how much we've collected.

But you're right, and I know you're going to point that out in your motion, but $I$ say that just to help the briefing, you and Mr. Stumphauzer, your co-counsels, start preparing.

I urge you guys to spend the energy, not kind of worrying about, Hey, they're asking for this and we have turned it over; Hey, they want this, and they've already collected that, because it's less of a concern.

You're going to get to brief that. But what helps me the most, if you guys tell me, you're not entitled to disgorgement because this number had nothing to do with -- I'm giving a hypothetical, of course -- has nothing to do with Par Funding or has any connection to what happened here; and the $S E C$ cannot pursue its disgorgement.

Do you know what I mean, Ms. Schein?
MS. SCHEIN: Yes, Your Honor, thank you.
THE COURT: Yeah, I just thought that would help everybody.

Ms. Berlin, do you want to attempt to add anything about anything we've discussed here today before we wrap up?

MS. BERIN: No, thank you. I was just going to remind everyone that, of course, if a number isn't ordered as disgorgement, then the Receiver doesn't have authority to then distribute those funds, which is why we seek the disgorgement figure in the final judgment; and then the Receiver can re-claim distribution, and we have a separate collections unit that starts looking at the collections issues and where they, basically, start getting involved.

I wanted to note the importance of an order that states the disgorgement that's here, because that's what the Receiver liquidate, hold onto -- that's what allows us to move to the collections' element, which is a different group at the Commission. But thank you, Your Honor. Nice seeing you.

And I will keep in mind that we'll be in person for that disgorgement hearing.

THE COURT: Yeah, I think it makes more sense to have it in person, it's easier for the court reporter and the importance of it, make life easier, yeah. I will get a head's up. I will coordinate when we get closer and get your replies and with everything being briefed, okay; with that being said, guys, I think we covered everything.

Mr. Kolaya, I have everything I need and May 5th report.

MR. KOLAYA: Your Honor, just one question briefly. THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. KOLAYA: We've received numerous phone calls from investors on this and the briefing schedule and motions are totally briefed and a hearing can be set, but do you have any indication about when an order will be issued on disgorgements?

THE COURT: It's stuff our briefs in our current briefing schedule, I'm trying to ballpark it, we're probably not ripe.

I know Ms. Schein and her team are preparing responses. You got to think, we still got a little bit of a ways to go with reply time.

I don't think this is ripe; 30 days, let's say, I'm ballparking it, right, or thereabouts, probably inside that or inside May. I would like -- the minute it's ripe, I want to set a hearing -- that much you can share with investors, there will be a hearing on investors.

The minute it's briefed and ripe, I will set it.

How long to take an order? I don't want to get anymore investor e-mails than $I$ do with an overdue order, whether I lock myself into a position; it's hard until I start writing it. I can give you a drop-dead, in terms of the summer in terms of making a ruling I have to have this done.

The Court plans on having something the end of the summer, if you think about a hearing in June, 60 days, I think it's realistic to say is that by the time we're in August, at some point we got something coming out, that much $I$ can make a
promise on because it puts you guys in a position to hopefully start a claims process in the fall, and that's the only way we're ever going to see this maybe by end of year getting to the point we want to get to.

So that's, I think, a very solid, fair timeline, and I'm willing to hold myself to that cut-off, because I've got a sense we can get something done over the summer for sure.

MR. KOLAYA: Your Honor, thank you. I know it's not a firm date, but that's helpful because the investors are very curious.

THE COURT: It's pretty firm. You can tell them it's very firm, end of the summer; if $I$ need to put in a little more elbow grease on it to get it out, then $I$ plan on putting it -it goes to the top of the pile -- so to say, it's hard, you know, I don't want to jinx myself -- something can happen in the summer, criminal, mostly, that's my only concern; I do have a couple special-set Medicare trials that can pull me away.

I have a special set Medicare trial in the summer that may be moving, you never know, so that's why I thought I'd give myself some wiggle room, I'm not 100 percent on how long it will take. I look forward to the briefing.

We're definitely -- I'll tell you this, we're definitely going to set it as soon as we can, because I do think OA will be valuable is available for questions and probably late June, prepare and read everything the coming
month and get the calendar date set down; and I will probably try, as I have done in the past, because we're not in a COVID situation anymore, I've got to decide how I'm going to do it, because I don't want to have a million people in the courtroom.

But I have to see if I do have enough interest in people coming. Maybe I can figure out a way to have it telephonically done or people can call in and listen to it live. I will figure that out for the investors; if they ask, I will try to make it available for the investors to move along.

All right, guys, thank you guys for your time. Hopefully, you will have a great rest of your day, and I will try to work on this right away so you guys can get a ruling from the Court. Okay.

Good afternoon. Bye-bye.
(Proceedings concluded at 12:13 p.m.)

C ERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the foregoing is an accurate transcription of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

July 8th, 2022
$\frac{\text { /s/Glenda M. Powers }}{\text { GLENDA M. POWERS, RPR, CRR, FPR }}$ United States District Court 400 North Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33128


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# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING<br>56 Forsyth Street, N.W.<br>Atlanta, Georgia 30303

For rules and forms visit www.call.uscourts.gov

August 03, 2022

Glenda Powers
Courtroom Services
400 N MIAMI AVE
MIAMI, FL 33128
Appeal Number: 22-11694-G
Case Style: Joseph Cole Barleta v. Ryan Stumphauzer
District Court Docket No: 9:20-cv-81205-RAR

TRANSCRIPT DUE: September 2, 2022 (30 days from appellant's certification)
We have not received your acknowledgment of the enclosed transcript order form and certification of completion of financial arrangements. We have assumed that the necessary financial arrangements have been made by the appellant for the preparation of the transcript, in accordance with appellant's certification, and accordingly we have fixed the date shown above for filing the transcript with the district court clerk.

Sincerely,
DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Lee Aaron, G/br
Phone \#: 404-335-6172

